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             THE 
                    FIELDS INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES
               
         
          
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PUBLIC 
                            LECTURE SERIES 
                            September 
                            11, 2014 at 5:00 p.m 
                            Fields Institute, Room 230 
                             
                           
                            ROBERT ALIBER 
                            University of Chicago 
                            The Source of Financial Crisis 
                 
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                    ABSTRACT 
                    There have been four waves of banking crisis in the last 
                      thirty years, each has involved three, four, or more countries; 
                      each country has experienced a sharp decline in prices of 
                      securities and most have had dramatic falls in the price 
                      of their currency. The first wave was in 1982 and involved 
                      Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and ten other developing countries. 
                      Japan and two of the Nordic countries--Finland and Sweden--were 
                      engulfed in the second wave in the early 1990s; the banking 
                      crisis in Norway was several years earlier. The Asian Financial 
                      Crisis that began in July 1997 was the third wave; Mexico 
                      had a crisis at the end of 1994. The fourth wave occurred 
                      in September 2008 and involved the United States, Britain, 
                      Iceland, Ireland, Spain, and then Greece and Portugal. 
                       
                      One of the unique features of the last thirty years is the 
                      strong overlap between banking crises and currency crises. 
                      Ninety percent of banking crises have occurred together 
                      with a currency crises, the borrowers have defaulted on 
                      foreign loans and the price of the countries' currency has 
                      declined, often sharply. And every currency crisis has occurred 
                      with a banking crisis.  
                       
                      My stylized model for this pairing is as follows. Every 
                      country that has experienced a banking crisis had previously 
                      experienced an economic boom. Moreover nearly every country 
                      that has experienced a boom before its crisis had experienced 
                      an increase in cross border investment inflows. When a country's 
                      currency is floating, changes in its current account balance 
                      must be continuously equal with different signs. The invisible 
                      hands are at work, the increase in the price of the country's 
                      currency and the increase in household wealth together explain 
                      the increase in the country's current account deficit. If 
                      the induced increase in the country's current deficit appears 
                      to be smaller than the autonomous increase in its capital 
                      account surplus, the market in the country's currency will 
                      not clear; the price of its currency or the price of securities 
                      or both prices will continue to increase until the market 
                      clears. 
                       
                      Moreover, every banking crisis that I have studied has occurred 
                      when the lenders became increasingly cautious about extending 
                      more credit to the borrowers. A banking crisis occurs when 
                      the flow of credit to a group of borrowers declines, and 
                      a currency crisis occurs when the flow of credit is from 
                      foreign lenders. The decline in the price of the currency 
                      as the currency crisis develops intensifies the banking 
                      crisis because the domestic currency counterpart of liabilities 
                      denominated in a foreign currency increase.  
                       
                      The data on the changes in the prices of currencies and 
                      the impact of cross border investment flows on national 
                      economies challenge the claims made by proponents of floating 
                      currencies in the 1950s and 1960s. They said changes in 
                      the prices of currencies would be gradual, some currencies 
                      have fallen off steep cliffs. They said the deviations between 
                      the market prices of currencies and the long run equilibrium 
                      prices would be smaller if currencies were allowed to float 
                      because the market prices of currencies would track the 
                      differences in inflation rates, instead these deviations 
                      have been many times larger. They claimed that there would 
                      be fewer currency crises; instead there have been many more 
                      currency crisis and they have been much more severe and 
                      have intensified banking crisis. They said that the uncertainty 
                      about the prices of currencies would insulate each country 
                      from shocks in other countries; instead the sharp variability 
                      in cross-border currency flows has led to the boom and bust 
                      cycle. They also claimed that uncertainty about the prices 
                      of currencies would not deter trade and investment (which 
                      obviously was inconsistent with their claim that uncertainty 
                      would insulate countries from shocks in other countries) 
                      but they never asked about the cost of hedging the uncertainty 
                      and who would bear these costs. 
                       
                      The monetary constitution for the gold standard was the 
                      "rules of the game", a descriptive model that 
                      summarized the how transfers of gold among countries would 
                      lead to a new equilibrium after a shock had led to payments 
                      imbalances. The Articles of Agreement of the International 
                      Monetary Fund was a monetary constitution, and proscribed 
                      certain changes in the prices of currencies. The current 
                      international monetary international monetary arrangement 
                      is dysfunctional because the sharp variability in cross 
                      border currency flows leads to boom and bust cycles. 
                   
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                   About Robert Aliber 
                  Robert Z. Aliber is a Professor Emeritus of International 
                    Economics and Finance at the University of Chicago. He is 
                    best known for his contribution to the theory of foreign direct 
                    investment. Aliber received a Bachelor of Arts degree from 
                    Williams College (1952) and Bachelor of Arts (1954) and a 
                    Master of Arts (1957) from Cambridge University. He received 
                    his Ph. D. from Yale University. He was appointed as an Associate 
                    Professor at the University of Chicago in 1964. 
                  Aliber brought out the fifth and sixth editions and is preparing 
                    the seventh edition of Charles Kindlebergers 1978 classic 
                    Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. 
                    Aliber predicted the Icelandic banking crisis months eighteen 
                    months before it happened. 
                  In this talk, Aliber offers a unique and very different view 
                    on the cause of financial crises, discusses why banking crises 
                    are almost always occur together with currency crises, and 
                    why cross border investment flows should be moderated.  
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